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Abstract
We develop a 2-country model of legal dynamics in which each country’s social welfare
depends generally on its actual law, its culturally ideal one, its technologically efficient one
and the actual law of the other country. In our model, countries are better off when all
these laws coincide. Moreover, in each country the actual law and the cultural biases of the
population respond to the cost of legal diversity, the cost of the divergence between the actual
law and both the culturally ideal law and the technological efficiency of regulation. We show
that international legal convergence is possible without any coordination between countries.
This happens when either there are no efficient legal rules, or when the technologically
efficient rule is unique across countries. In that case, legal uniformity is realized in the long
run. When there are country specific technologically efficient legal rules, we show that legal
convergence is not possible in the long run.
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1 Introduction
Increasing economic and cultural globalizations raise the economic and moral costs of legal
differences between countries and plead for an accelerated process of international unification
of laws. Yet, the way nations reach a compromise between the respect of culturally ideal
law (i.e., legal preferences), actual national law and foreign laws is influenced by several
conflicting factors.
First, according to some scholars there are intrinsic limits to the convergence of legal
systems. Countries usually choose legal rules that are consistent with the legal framework
∗We thank the editor, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, and an anonymous referee for very stimulating comments on
two previous versions of this paper. We also thank Susan Crettez for very helpful remarks on two previous versions
of this work.
1
and the social norms they inherited from the past. Law scholars such as Legrand (1996,
1997) share this viewpoint and conclude that international legal unification will not happen
spontaneously. Some law-and-economics scholars develop a similar idea via the notion of
legal origins (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, La Porta et al. 2008): countries are tied to the
legal system they have chosen in the past (however it was chosen) and this national legal
origin constrains further legal evolutions. Legal rules can change over time, but only at
the margin, remaining globally within the national legal framework. At an international
level, therefore, decentralized policies can only lead to a durable legal status quo. Some
authors also advance that countries should indeed converge toward country specific optima,
which would result in legal divergence (Balas et al., 2009, Guerriero, 2013). Achieving legal
uniformity would thus require international coordination. This legal uniformity, however,
might not be the best legal distance between countries.
On the contrary, several scholars in international relations (e.g., Pollack, 2007) and in-
ternational public law (e.g., Goodman and Jinks, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2013) argue that a key
factor of legal convergence is the change in the perception of the world that policy mak-
ers experience either by frequent interactions at an international level (i.e., international
socialization) and/or by feeling an obligation to comply with a dominant culture (i.e., accul-
turation). In this view, international interactions generate a convergence of legal preferences
which in turn leads to legal convergence (institutional isomorphism in the terms of Goodman
and Jinks, 2005, 2013).1
Another factor of legal convergence builds on the idea that legal rules could drift toward
efficiency over time. According to Merryman et al. (1994), there is often a unique optimal
solution to a legal problem. Therefore countries could converge spontaneously toward the
same rule when they face the same legal problem, even without any interactions among
them. This process is called “Natural convergence” in the comparative law literature. Com-
plications can arise, however, when a legal problem has multiple solutions. It is a well known
topic in comparative law that different legal rules can solve the same problem. In such cases
functional convergence occurs but formal laws diverge.
Levmore (1986) was one of the first to analyze legal convergence from a Law-and-
Economics perspective. According to him, if there is no efficient rule, divergence is likely
to arise. Our paper suggests the opposite. In constrast to Levmore, who analyzes legal
systems or traditions that do not necessarily engage in interactions, we focus on cases where
countries with different legal systems interact. Even if there is no clear efficient rule, legal
diversity is costly for these countries. This is the main engine of legal uniformity (which is
realized through gradual changes in legal preferences and actual legal systems).
While the study of legal dynamics is a very active topic in the law-and-economics litera-
ture, it currently lacks an analytical framework to understand the joint evolution of national
1In this paper, we focus on the evolution of public rules of law, but the same kind of process can be used
to understand the common evolution of some private practices. Concerning corporate governance, for instance,
the rise of interactions between private actors at an international level has led to a broad consensus on general
principles for firms’ objectives and management methods.
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preferences and national legal rules, and the conditions leading to legal convergence. To fill
this gap, we develop a 2-country model of legal dynamics in which each country’s social wel-
fare depends generally on its actual law, its culturally ideal one, its technologically efficient
one and the actual law of the other country. In this model, countries are better off when all
these laws coincide. Moreover, in each country the actual law and the cultural biases of the
population respond to three kinds of costs. The first kind is the cost of legal diversity. The
second kind is the cost of the divergence between the actual law and the culturally ideal law.
The third and last kind is the the cost of the divergence between the actual law and the
technological efficiency of regulation. In order to highlight the relative importance of each
factor, we follow an incremental approach: we start with a simple model of legal dynamics
with fixed legal preferences, and then progressively introduce endogenous changes in legal
preferences (namely endogenous culturally ideal laws), a unique technologically efficient legal
rule, and finally several technologically efficient legal rules.
We show that endogenous legal preferences can be a strong vector of legal convergence.
When there is no technologically efficient law, endogenous changes in legal preferences alone
can be sufficient to achieve de facto legal uniformity in the long run. In this way, we show
that legal uniformity does not always require international legal coordination. When there
is a unique technologically efficient legal rule, we show that national legal systems as well
as national legal preferences converge to this level. By contrast, when there are different
technologically efficient legal rules, legal divergence occurs in the long run. In such cases,
relying on decentralized policies is not sufficient to achieve legal convergence.
The paper unfolds as follows. In section 2, we present our model of legal dynamics and we
consider the benchmark case where legal preferences are fixed. In section 3, we analyze legal
dynamics when there are endogenous changes in legal preferences. In section 4, we study
the interplay between these changes in preferences and the natural convergence hypothesis
(we consider in turn the case where there is a unique technologically efficient legal rule and
the case where there are multiple national technologically efficient legal rules). We conclude
in the last section. The appendix provides the proofs of all the results.
2 A Simple Model of Legal Preferences
2.1 General assumptions
We develop a game theoretical model of legal convergence whose players are two countries and
introduce incrementally the different elements that play an important role in legal dynamics2.
Initially, we assume that the only strategic choices for the players are their laws. Next, we
suppose that the strategic choices also comprise their culturally ideal laws (i.e., their legal
preferences). Specifically, we consider that both the actual laws and legal preferences can be
2Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2011) also propose a model of legal dynamics, but its aims are quite different from what
we propose to study in this paper (the authors propose an explanation of the existence of cycles in the evolution
of legal systems).
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associated to points of the real line. We may interpret a point of the real line as being the
value of an aggregate index of legal rules concerning a specific issue of the legal system. The
construction of aggregate indexes of legal rules is a current practice in the empirical law-and-
economics literature. For instance, the Leximetrics database comprises several quantitative
indexes of legal rules about corporate governance, creditor law or labour law (see Armour et
al., 2009, and Siems, 2011).
More formally, we denote respectively by xit and piit the actual law and the legal preferences
of country i (i = 1, 2) at date t (t ∈ N). We assume that there is initially no legal uniformity,
i.e., x10 6= x20 and pi10 6= pi20. All these numbers are always common knowledge.
At each date, both countries decide simultaneously the magnitude of change of their laws
and, when possible, their legal preferences. The decision horizon of a country is one period
ahead, as if there were non-overlapping generations of law makers.3
Our aim is to study how laws and legal preferences evolve over time. We propose two
definitions concerning the issue of legal dynamics:
Definition 1 (Legal Convergence). There is legal convergence at date t if the legal distance
at this date decreases with respect to the previous period: |xit − xjt | < |xit−1 − xjt−1| (i 6= j).
Definition 2 (Legal Uniformity). There is legal uniformity at date t when the legal distance
is nil, i.e., |xit − xjt | = 0 (i 6= j).
The preferences of law makers are described by a utility function which is the sum of two
continuously differentiable sub-functions, all defined in R2: U i(xi, xj)+V i(xi, pii), i, j = 1, 2,
and i 6= j. The first sub-function U i describes the cost of divergence of country i ’s law from
the other country j’s law (see Carbonara and Parisi, 2007 or Crettez et al., 2013).4 We
assume that U i(xi, xj) reaches its maximum value if country i’s law xi is equal to country
j’s law xj . We also assume that this function is increasing with respect to xi if xi < xj and
decreasing if xi > xj . That is, this function increases where there is legal convergence and
decreases otherwise. The second sub-function, V i(xi, pii), i = 1, 2, describes the cost of the
divergence of country i’s laws from country i’s own legal preferences. We assume that this
function reaches its maximum when xi = pii. We also assume that this function is increasing
(resp. decreasing) with respect to xi (resp. with respect to pii) when xi < pii and decreasing
(resp. increasing) with respect to xi (resp. with respect to pii) when xi > pii.5 It is easy
3This assumption could reflect the fact that decision-makers are constantly aware of recurring events which
shorten their decision horizon (e.g. , elections). It considerably simplifies the analysis.
4The costs of legal diversity are well documented when it has an economic content. For example, Rodrik
(2004) argues that the diversity of national institutional and legal arrangements is the most important source of
transaction costs in international exchanges. According to this author, these costs broadly represent nearly 35%
in ad-valorem terms.
5For example the sub-function V i(xi, pii) models the type of costs assumed by Legrand (1996, 1997) who argues
that the foundations of legal systems build on the history, culture and collective preferences of each nation-state.
Putting in place a law that would be in dissonance with national preferences would create internal tensions. These
tensions are often observed in the European Union when harmonized legal rules, like the Bolkenstein Directive,
are at variance with some national legal preferences.
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to see that the quadratic function −(x − y)2 satisfies all the above properties, as would all
increasing functions of the type f(x − y). Finally we assume that both functions U i and
V i are continuously differentiable. This implies that the functions V i , i = 1, 2, satisfy the
property:
sign
(
V i2 (x, y)
)
= −sign(V i1 (x, y))
where V ik is the partial derivative of V i with respect to its k-th argument.
2.2 The Nash equilibrium
For the remaining part of this section, we will assume that legal preferences are constant
across time (i.e., piit = pii, i = 1, 2 ). We will relax this assumption in the next section.
At each date t, given the value pii of its legal preferences and the choice made simulta-
neously by the other country, the law-maker of country i (i = 1, 2, i 6= j) chooses the value
of its law xit in order to maximize the following utility function:
U i(xit, x
j
t ) + V i(xit, pii). (1)
In a Nash equilibrium, the first-order conditions are as follows:
U11 (x1t , x2t ) + V 11 (x1t , pi1) = 0 (2)
U21 (x2t , x1t ) + V 21 (x2t , pi2) = 0. (3)
Each of these conditions reflects a trade-off between decreasing the cost of legal distance and
decreasing the cost of the divergence between the actual law and the culturally ideal law.
The next Proposition establishes that legal uniformity is never satisfied in equilibrium
when legal preferences are fixed.
Proposition 1. When legal preferences are fixed and are initially different (pi1 < pi2), legal
convergence stops at a given date and legal uniformity never occurs. Moreover, national laws
are closer to each other than national legal preferences:
pi1 < x1 < x2 < pi2. (4)
The distance between laws is smaller than the distance between legal preferences. More-
over, once the laws x1 and x2 are chosen by national law-makers (that is, at date 0), there
is no more convergence because a steady-state is achieved. As a consequence, we observe a
strong legal origins effect (Deakin et al., 2007): the distance between laws remains constant
over time and legal uniformity never happens. These results arise because there is a trade-off
between reducing the legal distance and increasing the gap between the actual laws and the
national preferences. Legal uniformity does not occur because it is costly for countries to
depart from their legal preferences, even though it is also costly to have laws different from
those of other countries. The equilibrium values of the laws are then different from the
culturally ideal ones. Once the equilibrium is realized at date 0, there is no reason to depart
from it later on. The conditions under which countries make their choice are indeed always
the same in each successive period.
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Proposition 1 above embodies Legrand’s viewpoint (1996, 1997), according to which legal
convergence should not occur. Countries should have a legal system that remains close to
their culturally ideal one. Guerriero (2013) provide theoretical foundations and empirical
evidence about this idea that different cultural preferences lead to different legal systems.He
shows that after independence 156 transplants changed once and for all their law-making
institution to implement their culturally dependent optimal rule.
3 Legal Dynamics with Endogenous Legal Prefer-
ences
An important assumption in the model presented in the previous section is that legal prefer-
ences do not evolve over time. We relax this assumption in this section. We now assume that
each utility function of the law-makers is the sum of three sub-functions. The first two sub-
functions are the functions U i and V i used in the preceding functions. The third and new
subfunction is a continously differentiable function W i(piit, piit−1). This function describes the
cost borne by country i from changing its preferences. We assume that this function reaches
its maximum when preferences do not change, i.e., when piit = piit−1. We also assume that
W i is increasing with respect to piit when piit < piit−1 and decreasing with respect to piit when
piit > pi
i
t−1. Before analyzing the model with endogenous legal preferences, we now justify
the relevance of this new assumption.
3.1 Endogenous legal preferences
We can first justify the assumption of endogenous legal preferences using the notion of
international socialization which appears in the international relations literature. Pollack
(2007) reviews how policy and law makers’ preferences change by interacting and socializing
at an international level, inducing changes in their vision of the world. Persuasion, for
instance, is often used by representatives or non governmental organizations to change their
foreign colleagues’ preferences.
A second rationale for endogenous legal preferences refers to what Goodman and Jinks
(2008, 2013) call acculturation: “acculturation... [ is ] the general process by which actors
adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture. This complex social
process is driven, at bottom, by identification with a reference group which generates varying
degrees of cognitive and social pressures to conform with the behavioural expectations of the
wider culture.”6 Acculturation works even if there are no physical international interactions.
For example, important foreign constitutional and legislative provisions can effectively cause
domestic internalization. Foreign practices are thus examined by a national court not for the
legal reasoning of a foreign court, but as evidence of a norm that is widely accepted by other
states. The U.S. supreme court’s reasoning seems to witness such a process of acculturation
(Pollack, 2008).
6See Goodman and Jinks (2004, 2013) for more details on the microeconomic process of acculturation.
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By displaying norms that are interiorized by states and their representatives, interna-
tional institutions are an important vector of acculturation. In European Union studies, for
instance, a growing number of scholars argue that international institutions, and notably
EU ones, shape preferences and identities of individuals and member states in Europe.
Goodman and Jinks (2005, 2013) argue that acculturation is specifically important to
understand legal convergence (i.e., what they called institutional isomorphism). According
to them, legal convergence is primarily the result of acculturation, driven by the desire of
individuals to fit in with a reference group of modern states7.
The assumption of endogenous preferences is also often used in the economic literature
(see e.g., Kuran and Sandholm 2008, or Alesina and Reich, 2013). While international
socialization and acculturation are essentially sociological notions, they have many features
in common with the concept of endogenous preferences as it is developed in economics. In
this paper, we try to conciliate the notions of international socialization and acculturation
with economics and rational choice theory. Nevertheless, the way we model the evolution
of preferences, as resulting from agents’ choices, differs from standard assumptions of the
economic literature where the evolution process of preferences is exogenous, and relies on
evolutionary arguments (Bowles, 1998, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Kuran and Sandholm, 2008).
Assuming that legal preferences or norms are endogenous in law-and-economics (and
institutional economics) as we do is certainly not new (see,e.g., Huck, 1998, Kotsadam and
Jakobsson, 2011). Levmore (1986), in his analysis of functional convergence from a Law-and-
Economics viewpoint, gives some credit to the possibility of endogenous legal preferences:
“The discussion that follows, ..., most readily supports a position that combines an emphasis
on law as “a device shaped by the members of society in response to internal conditions in the
search for ways and means to translate their basic social postulates into action” with a view
that changes (of these postulates) are stimulated when a culture’s rules are not consonant
with its survival” (Levmore, ibid, page 248).
Of course, it could also be argued that norms are constant or changing infrequently. Some
evidence, for instance, shows that cultural biases are indeed long-lasting traits (Guiso et al.,
2008) which only change due to dramatic investment and consumption needs (Boranbay and
Guerriero, 2012) or historical shocks (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). In this connection,
Boranbay and Guerriero (2012) study a model where a group of agents “costly instills into
its members a psychological gain from cooperating, for instance, by attracting a monastic
order”. They find that the evidence coming from medieval Europe suggests that cultural
preferences can evolve in the short and medium run provided that the economic incentives
of which they are an expression are sufficiently strong.8
7Goodman and Jinks (2013) also point to material inducement and persuasion as other means to achieve legal
convergence.
8Boranbay and Guerriero (2012) is in line with the key insight of evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides,
and Tooby, 1992): group-specific cultural values result from a process that selects, via natural selection or cross-
punishment, norms maximizing the fitness of the group’s members.
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3.2 The Nash equilibrium
Law-makers simultaneously choose their new legal preferences and their legal systems in
order to maximize the following utility function:
U1(x1t , x2t ) + V 1(x1t , pi1t ) +W 1(pi1t , pi1t−1), i 6= j. (5)
The result of countries’ interactions at date t is given by the Nash equilibrium (x1t , pi1t , x2t , pi2t )9.
The following Proposition differentiates between the ideal and actual legal systems and states
that the legal distance between countries always decreases over time.
Proposition 2. Assume that legal preferences are initially different, i.e. pi1−1 < pi2−1. Let a
sequence of Nash equilibria be given. Then both laws and legal preferences tend to be more
alike across time. Moreover, at each date t, the legal distance is smaller than the distance
between legal preferences:
pi1t−1 < pi
1
t < x
1
t < x
2
t < pi
2
t < pi
2
t−1. (6)
The sequence of legal systems (x1t , x2t ) and legal preferences (pi1t , pi2t )t converges respectively
to the same limit. Legal uniformity is realized in the long-run.
This result captures the idea that socialization and acculturation make legal systems
and legal preferences more alike accross time (institutional isomorphism in Goodman and
Jenkins terms).
To intuitively grasp this result, we first observe that in a Nash equilibrium the following
optimality conditions are satisfied at all dates t:
U11 (x1t , x2t ) + V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) = 0 (7)
V 12 (x1t , pi1t ) +W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) = 0 (8)
U21 (x2t , x1t ) + V 21 (x2t , pi2t ) = 0 (9)
V 22 (x2t , pi2t ) +W 21 (pi2t , pi2t−1) = 0. (10)
The first equality means that the marginal gain of a decrease in legal diversity for country
1 (U11 (x1t , x2t )) is compensated by the marginal cost of the distance between its actual law
and its legal preferences (V 11 (x1t , pi1t )). The second equality means that the marginal gain of
a decrease in the distance between country 1’s laws and its legal preferences is compensated
by the marginal cost of changing these preferences. The other equations can be interpreted
in a similar way.
To understand the above Proposition let us assume that pi1t−1 ≤ x2t ≤ pi2t ≤ pi2t−1 and
let us check that it is in the interest of country 1 to choose x1t and pi1t so as to verify:
pi1t−1 ≤ pi1t ≤ x1t ≤ x2t ≤ pi2t ≤ pi2t−1. Indeed, under this ranking, we see that the marginal
gain U11 (x1t , x2t ) of making laws closer is non-negative (because U i). This gain is compensated
9While we use the same notations for the equililbrium values of the legal systems as in Proposition , these
equilibrium values obtained with endogenous legal preferences are a priori different from the equilibrium values
obtained with fixed legal preferences.
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by the marginal loss (V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) ≤ 0) borne by country 1 in making its law more distant
from its legal preferences. Moreover, the marginal gain in closing the gap between legal
preferences and country 1’s law (V 12 (x1t , pi1t ) ≥ 0) is compensated by the marginal cost of
changing its legal preferences (W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) ≤ 0).
From the first-order conditions, one can deduce that instant legal uniformity (x1t = x2t )
is never a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, given our assumption on U i, this would imply that
U11 (x1t , x2t ) = 0 and thus V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) = 0. But the later condition only holds when x1t =
pi1t . Moreover, from the second equation and our assumption on the function W i, we have
V 12 (x1t , pi1t ) = 0, so that W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) = 0, and thus pi1t = pi1t−1. The same reasoning applies
to country 2, so that we finally have: pi1t−1 = pi2t−1, which is impossible by assumption.
Using the same argument we can show that the status quo is impossible, and that the
only possible outcome is one satisfying the statement of the Proposition.
Assuming that all functions U i, V i and W i, i = 1, 2, are continuously differentiable
enables us to show that complete legal unification occurs in the long run.10
Proposition 2 shows that the cost of legal diversity as well as the cost of the distance be-
tween actual laws and legal preferences within countries are key factors for legal convergence
in the long run. Differences in legal preferences prevent laws from converging instantly and
from eliminating the cost of legal diversity. This difference is a key reason why countries in
this model are continuously induced to adapt their legal preferences.
We conclude from this Proposition that even in the absence of legal cooperation, legal
convergence and legal uniformity can occur in the long run, via a step-by-step process of
adjustment of both legal rules and legal preferences. As long as countries can choose their
desired mix of changes in actual laws and preferences, it is optimal for them to always change
their laws and their legal preferences. This leads to a continuous process of legal convergence,
which ends in the long run in legal uniformity (under a mild technical assumption). This
contrast strongly with the Proposition 1 and in the terms of Deakin et al. (2007), when
legal preferences can change over time, we should assist to a ”weak legal origin effect”.
Legal rules can be different in the short run if they are initially different, but they tends
to become identical in the long run, because countries also gradually converge in terms of
their culturally ideal laws. International convergence of values is then necessary to have
international convergence of legal rules.
3.3 Evidence about legal convergence
In this section, we have shown that legal convergence can occur spontaneously when prefer-
ences change and legal diversity is costly. This result is illustrated by the findings of Good-
man and Jinks (2013). They notice that nation-states have adopted similar institutional
forms and policies across a range of issue-areas, such as education, environmental protec-
tion, scientific research, and state administration (see Goodman and Jinks, 2013, chapter
10The requirement that the functions U i, V i and W i be continuously differentiable ensures that the first-order
conditions are satisfied at the steady-state of the dynamics.
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4). State convergence with respect to women’s rights is an example of legal convergence in
these issue-areas. As Goodman and Jinks (2004) put it:
After an initial stage of early adopters, the number of states providing women
the right to vote increased steeply and included most states before the rate of
adoption tapered off. Additionally, an important finding indicates a “contagion”
effect: once the norm was institutionalized, a strong predictor for whether an
individual state would enact women’s suffrage was whether other states in its
region had done so in the past five years. The overall findings suggest that,
compared with local conditions such as the strength of domestic women’s rights
groups, countries apparently are affected much less strongly by internal factors
and much more strongly by shifts in the international logic of political citizenship.
Some recent examples of international waves of change have occurred in European coun-
tries, for example on the possibility to abort freely or to contract same-sex marriage. Inter-
national references to foreign laws were constantly made during the legislative procedures
of change. Abortion is now legal in nearly all European countries. Countries with catholic
roots such as Spain and Portugal have changed their laws later but in the long run, culture
and religion have not been barriers to legal convergence.11
4 Legal Dynamics with Endogenous Legal Prefer-
ences and the Natural Convergence Assumption
4.1 Natural convergence
Discussions about legal dynamics in the law-and-economics literature often focus on the idea
that some legal rules are economically more efficient than others. Levmore (1986) introduces
an explanation of variety and uniformity in legal systems. Considering that many legal rules
serve to channel behavior, the author argues that “we should find more uniformity across
legal systems when theory tells us that a rule matters. For example, since it is easy to predict
the deterioration of the social and economic fabric of any society if there are no deterrents to
theft, we should expect to find thieves liable at least for what they have taken, and probably
more. For many of the same reasons, we should expect negligent behavior to be discouraged
as well”. Such examples refer to functional convergence.
A corresponding view in the comparative law literature is that if countries face identical
problems and if there is only one optimal solution for a given legal problem, countries will
converge spontaneously toward this optimal solution in the long run (Merryman et al., 1994).
This view is summarized by Zweigert and Kötz (1998) as follows: “Different legal systems
give the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life,
11Of course, theses correlations are not a proof of the effects of international socialization on legal convergence.
As mentioned by a referee, there exists a plethora of possible unobserved determinants of legal changes and
preferences evolution that could account for the observed correlations.
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despite the great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style
of operations”. In corporate law for instance, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argue that a
broad consensus has emerged about conceptual elements such as the necessity of managing
the firm in the interest of shareholders. This consensus has led to similar changes in legal
rules over the world. Competitive pressures have also induced convergence towards efficient
law in the long run. Roe (2000, 2001) even argues that competitive forces tend to erase the
differences between the economic points of view of political parties (e.g., left parties have
became less hostile to shareholders over time).
We now take into account in the model the cost of not choosing an efficient legal rule.
We assume that the preferences of law-makers are represented by the sum of the three sub-
functions used in the preceding function and the (continuously differentiable) sub-function
Zi(xit, xi), where xi is the efficient rule for country i. With these preferences, Zi is maximized
when xit = xi; it is increasing with respect to xit when xit < xi, and decreasing when xit > xi.
For some legal scholars, the determination of the optimal legal rule is country or system
specific. For example, a civil law system can be as efficient as a common law (see, e.g.,
Garoupa and Ligu¨erre, 2011, Guerriero, 2013). In terms of our model, this means that
we can either assume that there is only one efficient legal rule on a given issue, or assume
that there are multiple country dependent efficient legal rules. In the former case we have
formally: x1 = x2 = x∗. In the latter case, x1 6= x2. We study legal dynamics in each of
these cases in turn.
4.2 The case with a unique optimal legal rule
We assume that at each date t the law-makers maximize the following objective which
summarizes the elements aforementioned:
U i(xit, x
j
t ) + V i(xit, piit) +W i(piit, piit−1) + Zi(xit, x), i 6= j. (11)
4.2.1 The Nash equilibrium
In a Nash equilibrium the first-order conditions are as follows:
U11 (x1t , x2t ) + V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) + Z11 (x1t , x) = 0 (12)
V 12 (x1t , pi1t ) +W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) = 0 (13)
U21 (x2t , x1t ) + V 21 (x2t , pi2t ) + Z21 (x2t , x) = 0 (14)
V 22 (x2t , pi2t ) +W 21 (pi2t , pi2t−1) = 0. (15)
Only the first and third conditions differ from those of the preceding section. In addition
to the cost of legal distance and the cost of the difference between the actual law and legal
preferences, the choice of law now takes into account the cost of legal inefficiency (i.e., the
cost of choosing a law different from the efficient one). For instance, decreasing further the
legal distance with country j brings about an increase in the utility of country i which is
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compensated by the negative effects of an increase in the inefficiency of its law and/or an
increase in the distance with its legal preferences.
When there is a unique optimal legal rule, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let (x1t , x2t , pi1t , pi2t )t be a sequence of Nash equilibria. Then the laws and
legal preferences of both countries converge and legal uniformity is achieved in the long run.
Moreover, the limit law is the unique efficient one: limt→+∞ xit = limt→+∞ piit = x, i = 1, 2.
Both countries finally adopt the efficient rule. Proposition 3 is similar to Proposition 2 in
the sense that endogenous preferences allow for legal uniformity in the long run. But here,
the long run value of the legal rule is the (unique) efficient one. It always pays to change a
country’s legal preferences so as to make them closer to the efficient legal rules.
The property that legal uniformity occurs in the long run depends strongly on the as-
sumption that there is a unique optimal legal rule. When there are multiple optimal legal
rules we will show that this result does not hold anymore.
4.3 The case with country specific optimal legal rules
We now analyze legal dynamics when the efficient legal rule is country dependent (we denote
by xi the efficient legal rule of country i, i = 1, 2, x1 6= x2)). As stated by Deakin et al.
(2007), “legal rules are endogenized by local economic conditions and political context. This
is a theme common both to modern comparative legal doctrine of functional analysis and
to the varieties-of-capitalism approach. The same effect might be achieved in one system
by a rule of law and in another by self-regulatory instruments of soft law”. For example, an
efficient labour law can be country specific because the weight given to job protection is not
the same everywhere.
We now assume that at each date t the law-makers maximize the following objective:
U i(xit, x
j
t ) + V i(xit, piit) +W i(piit, piit−1) + Zi(xit, xi), i 6= j. (16)
4.3.1 The Nash equilibrium
In a Nash equilibrium the first-order conditions are as follows:
U11 (x1t , x2t ) + V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) + Z11 (x1t , x1) = 0 (17)
V 12 (x1t , pi1t ) +W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) = 0 (18)
U21 (x2t , x1t ) + V 21 (x2t , pi2t ) + Z21 (x2t , x2) = 0 (19)
V 22 (x2t , pi2t ) +W 21 (pi2t , pi2t−1) = 0. (20)
These conditions and their interpretations are similar to those obtained for the case where
there is a unique efficient legal rule.
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4.3.2 Steady state and legal dynamics
Using the equilibrium first-order conditions, we obtain the next result concerning the steady
state of the dynamics.
Proposition 4. In a steady state, we have: x1 < pi1 = x1 < x2 = pi2 < x2. In a steady-
state, the actual laws coincide with legal preferences. Moreover, in each country the actual
law differs from the corresponding optimal legal rules.
The above result shows that there is no legal uniformity in a steady state. Moreover, in
each country the actual law coincide with its legal preferences. These preferences, however,
do not coincide with the efficient legal rules. The distance between the laws remains positive
but smaller than the difference between the country’s efficient legal rules. There is thus a
compromise between the efficiency loss and the cost of legal distance.
The general study of the dynamics, the convergence and stability properties of the steady
state is quite complex and it is not easy to obtain general results. The next Lemma, however,
illustrates a case where the legal dynamics remain in the interval [x1, x2]
Lemma 1. Assume that piit−1 belongs to [x1, x2], i = 1, 2.Then, xis and piis belong to [x1, x2],
for all date s ≥ t, i = 1, 2.
It is difficult to obtain more convergence results.12 Yet, we can prove more results with
quadratic preferences.
4.3.3 Global stability of the steady-state in the quadratic case
We will now use the following quadratic specification of the objective functions:
U1 = −α12 (x
1
t − x2t )2 −
β1
2 (x
1
t − pi1t )2 −
γ1
2 (pi
1
t − pi1t−1)2 −
θ1
2 (x
1
t − x1)2 (21)
U2 = −α22 (x
2
t − x1t )2 −
β1
2 (x
2
t − pi2t )2 −
γ1
2 (pi
2
t − pi2t−1)2 −
θ2
2 (x
2
t − x2)2. (22)
With these functions the first-order necessary conditions are as follows:
−α1(x1t − x2t )− β1(x1t − pi1t )− θ1(x1t − x1) = 0 (23)
β1(x1t − pi1t )− γ1(pi1t − pi1t−1) = 0 (24)
−α2(x2t − x1t )− β2(x2 − pi2t )− θ2(x2t − x2) = 0 (25)
β2(x2t − pi2t )− γ2(pi2t − pi2t−1) = 0. (26)
We can check that the steady-state is given by the following expressions:
xi∞ = pii∞ =
(αj + θj)θixi + αiθjxj
αiθj + θi(αj + θj)
, i 6= j, i = 1, 2 j = 1, 2. (27)
Concerning the dynamics, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 5. In the quadratic case, the steady-state is globally stable.
12We can prove, however, that under the assumptions of Lemma 1 there are an infinite number of times for
which the sequence (xit, piit)t (i = 1, 2) is arbitrarily close to the steady state studied above.
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This result means that whatever the initial values of the laws and legal preferences in a
given country, their values converge to the same number, which is country dependent, and
which lies between x1 and x2. Legal uniformity does not occur in the long run (the legal
distance remains constant).
4.4 Evidence of “natural convergence”
Many scholars have documented a great wave of convergence of legal rules which have an
important economic content (see, e.g., Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, who use a comparative law
approach). The main active domains concern corporate law and stock market law, both of
which have transnational implications. At the same time, all rules in the domain of corporate
law and stock market law are not equivalent from an economic efficiency viewpoint. In conti-
nental Europe and Japan, changes in securities law and (to a lesser extent) in corporate law
have increased the sensitivity of managers to the interests of external (minority) shareholders
and there is evidence of some convergence of legal rules (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001,
Lele and Siems, 2006, Perraudin et al., 2013). Siems (2008) provides a detailed compara-
tive law analysis of the process of legal convergence in shareholder law. While he proposes
nuanced views about this process, Siems highlights some trends of converging changes in na-
tional legal cultures (Civil Law and Common Law, Western and Asian law) and some trends
of convergence in shareholder law. According to him, this diminishing distance between legal
views and legal rules of different countries is driven partly by the internationalization of the
economy and partly by the pressures of specific groups (companies, shareholders, foreign
countries and international organizations) to converge. These different trends support the
results of this section.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that legal convergence can occur in the long run when legal
preferences are endogenous. To reduce the cost of legal diversity, countries can adapt their
legal systems and their preferences. A mix of theses changes is optimal. It is indeed doubtful
that adapting to legal diversity can be carried out only by changing legal systems. Making
concessions on preferences is also necessary. The concessions reduce the cost borne out of
the difference between laws and legal norms, which arise when countries change their legal
systems to reduce legal diversity. If the legal preferences of a country can evolve over time,
laws and preferences should gradually converge toward the legal systems and preferences of
other nations, while at the same time these other nations follow a similar pattern.
Our conclusion with regard to the possibility of achieving legal convergence differs for
example from the view of Legrand (1997), to whom laws depend essentially on the preferences
of nations. If preferences are fixed and different across countries, legal convergence will not
take place, and can even be undesirable.
Our model implies that the speed of legal convergence is different according to different
laws, depending negatively on the magnitude of the costs of change, and positively on the
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importance of the process of acculturation/socialization. The speed of convergence could be
lower when the costs of change are high and when international interactions are infrequent,
or do not induce a process of international socialization. The ongoing process of global-
ization and internationalization of cultural and moral values13 should then increase legal
convergence.
When legal problems have solutions that can be ranked depending on their efficiency and
when the optimal solution is unique, unification occurs in the long run because all countries
tend to choose the optimal rule. Legal preferences change in the way that this optimal rule
is the preferred rule in the long run.
An optimal solution, however, is not necessarily unique. For instance, choosing between
the death penalty or a life sentence, allowing same-sex marriages or not, depend fundamen-
tally on the cultural and moral values of people, of norms within a given country, rather than
discussions on the intrinsic efficiency of the rule. In such cases, theories of legal evolution
that build on natural convergence can not explain the process of legal evolution. Conver-
gence cannot occur by this means. Convergence, is still is often observed for these kinds
of rules. We can explain this fact by the effects of acculturation/socialization. From this
viewpoint, international socialization can explain legal convergence even when there is no
legal rule intrinsically preferable to others.
A potential limit of our analysis is that in our model law-makers do not take into account
the future and the past. This assumption is made to simplify the study of the dynamics.14
The fact that we do not consider the past, i.e., the cost of legal change, overestimates the
speed of legal convergence because we eliminate one reason which would explain the difficulty
of changing a legal system. Neglecting the past is a strong assumption. For instance, in
common law jurisdictions, an appellate judge fixes in each period a rule taking into account
the cost of justifying the distance of such law from the precedent set by a previous appellate
judge (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007).15We neglect this phenomenon, i.e., stare decisis.
In a different but related paper (see Crettez et al., 2013) we have addressed the issue of
the effect of the length of the decision horizon in a model where the law-makers bear the cost
of changing the laws (i.e., where the past matters for the law-makers). We have found that
a long decision horizon does not prevent legal convergence. There is no reason to think that
this property would not hold here too. Moreover, while we overestimate the speed of legal
convergence by not considering the past, we also underestimate the speed of convergence by
not considering the future. If the decision-horizon of the law makers were long, they would
take into account the impact of their present decisions on the future costs of legal distance
and the future costs of changing legal preferences. As a result, legal convergence would
probably be faster. To sum up, a change in the decision horizon of policymakers should
13For reference about this process, see Goodman and Kinks (2013) for the globalisation of values, or Cowen
(2004) for the globalization of culture.
14Otherwise we would have two additional state-variables, one for each country, and it would not be easy to
study the game, even in the quadratic case.
15We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
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change the speed of convergence but not the process of convergence itself. Our proposition,
while based on strong assumptions, should remain true when policymakers take into account
the future or the past.
In our model also, legal convergence – be it in the short or the long run – always occurs
in a non-cooperative way. Legal cooperation can speed up or slow down and stop legal
convergence (legal convergence may not necessarily be optimal). An interesting topic for
further research would be to investigate whether and when legal competition is preferable
to legal cooperation in a setting where preferences are endogenous.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that x1 ≥ x2. Given our assumptions on functions U i and
V i this implies U11 (x1, x2) ≤ 0, and then V 1(x1, pi1) ≤ 0. Thus x1 ≥ pi1. Similarly, we
have U2(x2, x1) ≥ 0, and then V 2(x2, pi2) ≤ 0. This later inequation implies that x2 ≥ pi2.
Therefore, we have pi2 ≤ x2 ≤ x1 ≤ pi1, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. By definition, a Nash equilibrium at date t satisfies the following
optimality conditions:
U11 (x1t , x2t ) + V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) = 0, (28)
V 12 (x1t , pi1t ) +W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) = 0, (29)
U21 (x2t , x1t ) + V 21 (x2t , pi2t ) = 0, (30)
V 22 (x2t , pi2t ) +W 21 (pi2t , pi2t−1) = 0. (31)
Let us first prove that x1t ≤ x2t . If not, x1t > x2t . Then, U11 (x1t , x2t ) < 0 and from (28), it
follows that: V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) > 0. This implies that x1t < pi1t . Using a similar argument with
equation (30), one may show that: x2t > pi2t .
Using our assumptions on the functions V i in (29) and (31), we have: sign
(
V 11 (x1t , pi1t )
)
=
−sign(V 12 (x1t , pi1t )) and sign(V 21 (x2t , pi2t )) = −sign(V 22 (x2t , pi2t )).
Since, V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) > 0, it follows that W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) > 0. This implies that: pi1t < pi1t−1.
Similarly, we may prove that: pi2t > pi2t−1. We have thus proven that:
pi2t−1 < pi
2
t < x
2
t < x
1
t < pi
1
t < pi
1
t−1, (32)
which is a contradiction. Then, we must have: x1t ≤ x2t . It then follows that U11 (x1t , x2t ) ≥ 0
and from (28), V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) ≤ 0 ⇒ x1t ≥ pi1t . As sign
(
V 11 (x1t , pi1t )
)
= −sign(V 12 (x1t , pi1t )), one
has V 12 (x1t , pi1t ) ≥ 0 and from (29), one has W 11 (pi1t , pi1t−1) ≤ 0. This implies pi1t ≥ pi1t−1.
A similar reasoning leads to: x2t ≤ pi2t and pi2t ≤ pi2t−1. We have thus proven:
pi1t−1 ≤ pi1t ≤ x1t ≤ x2t ≤ pi2t ≤ pi2t−1. (33)
Now if x1t = x2t , one can see, by using the same kind of argument as above, that pi1t−1 = pi2t−1,
which is a contradiction. Then, since U i1(xit, x
j
t )(−1)1+i > 0, i 6= j, one can easily see that
pi2t−1 < pi2t < x2t < x1t < pi1t < pi1t−1. The fact that this property holds at each date t follows
by induction.
Let us now prove that legal uniformity is realized in the long run. The sequence (pi1t )t
is non-decreasing and upper-bounded. It thus converges to a limit pi1. The sequence (pi2t )t
is non-increasing and lower-bounded. It thus also converges to a limit pi2. Now consider
the sequence (x1)t (which lies in the set [pi1−1, pi2−1]). Let pi1 be a limit of any converging
subsequence. Using equation (29) and by passing to the limit, we obtain:
V 12 (x1, pi1) +W 11 (pi1, pi1) = 0. (34)
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We know that W 11 (pi1, pi1) = 0. Thus V 12 (x1, pi1) = 0. It follows that V 11 (x1, pi1) = 0. This
implies that: x1 = pi1. Since this is true for all limits of converging subsequences of (x1t )t
this implies that this sequence converges to pi1. By the same argument, we can show that
the sequence (x2t )t converges to pi2. Finally, using equation (28) and passing to the limit, we
obtain that:
U11 (x1x2) + V 11 (x1, pi1) = 0 (35)
Since x1 = pi1 this equation reduces to: U11 (x1x2) = 0. This implies that x1 = x2. The proof
is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof goes through a series of lemmas. We will first consider the
cases where maxi piit−1 ≤ x. Then, we will address the case where mini piit−1 < x < maxi piit−1.
Before that, we will prove the next lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (x1t , x2t , pi1t , pi2t ) be a Nash equilibrium at date t. Then we must have either
xit ≥ piit ≥ piit−1 or xit ≤ piit ≤ piit−1, i = 1, 2.
Proof. Let us consider the necessary condition for optimality:
V i2 (xit, piit) +W i1(piit, piit−1) = 0. (36)
Recall that sign
(
V i2 (x, y)
)
= −sign(V i1 (x, y)). If xit ≥ piit, then V i1 (xit, piit) ≤ 0, and then,
V i2 (xit, piit) ≥ 0. Thus, we have W i1(piit, piit−1) ≤ 0, so that piit ≥ piit−1. By the same reasoning,
we can show that is if xit ≤ piit, then piit ≤ piit−1.
• The case where pi1t−1 < pi2t−1 < x (assuming w.l.o.g that maxi piit−1 = pi2t−1)
Lemma 3. In a Nash equilibrium, we have : x1t > pi1t .
Proof. Assume that x1t ≤ pi1t . Then we cannot have x1t ≤ x2t . Indeed, in this case, we have
Z11 (x1t , x) ≤ 0, and so x1t ≥ x. But from Lemma 2 this implies that pi1t−1 ≥ x which is
impossible. So we necessarily have x1t > x2t . Now assume that x2t ≤ pi2t . Then, from Lemma
1, we must have Z21 (x2t , x) ≤ 0, so that x2t ≥ x. Again, this implies that x1t ≥ x, and thus
pi1t−1 ≥ x, which is a contradiction. Now consider the case where x2t > pi2t . Since x1t > x2t , it
follows from Lemma 1 that pi1t−1 > pi2t−1, which is impossible.
From the two preceding lemmas, we know that in a Nash equilibrium, we always have
x1t > pi
1
t ≥ pi1t−1.
Lemma 4. In a Nash equilibrium, we always have max{x1t , x2t } ≤ x.
Proof. Assume that x1t ≥ x2t . As x1t > pi1t , we must have Z11 (x1t , x) ≥ 0, so that x1t ≤ x and
the result follows. Suppose instead that x1t < x2t . If x2t ≤ pi2t , then as Z21 (x2t , x) ≥ 0, we must
have x2t ≤ x and the result follows again. If, on the other hand, we have x2t > pi2t , then since
we have pi2t < pi2t−1 < x, the conclusion follows.
Lemma 5. In a Nash equilibrium, we have: min{x1t , x2t } ≥ pi1t−1.
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Proof. If x2t ≥ x1t , this is immediate (this stems from Lemmas 2 and 3). Assume now that
x1t > x
2
t . Assume that x2t ≤ pi2t . Then Z21 (x2t , x) ≤ 0 and thus x2t ≥ x. So pi2t−1 ≥ x, which
is a contradiction. Then consider the case x2t > pi2t . As x1t > x2t and pi2t−1 > pi1t−1, the
conclusion follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 6. In a Nash equilibrium, we have: max{pi1t , pi2t } ≤ x.
Proof. We already know that x1t > pi1t and x1t ≤ x (Lemmas 3 and 4). Let us show that
pi2t ≤ x. If x2t ≥ pi2t , this is immediate (Lemma 3). Assume now that x2t < pi2t . If pi2t ≥ x then
pi2t−1 ≥ x (Lemma 2), which is impossible and the result follows.
Lemma 7. In a Nash equilibrium we have: min{pi1t−1, pi2t−1} = pi1t−1 ≤ min{pi1t , pi2t }.
Proof. If pi2t ≥ pi1t , this is immediate, since pi1t ≥ pi1t−1 (Lemmas 2 and 3), and pi1t−1 < pi2t−1
by assumption. Assume now that pi2t < pi1t . Suppose that pi2t < pi1t−1. If x2t ≥ pi2t , this
is impossible (because of Lemma 2 and the assumption that pi1t−1 < pi2t−1). If x2t < pi2t ,
then from Lemma 2 we have x2t < pi2t < pi1t−1, from Lemma 5 this is impossible (because
pi1t−1 ≤ x1t ).
Remark. When pi2t−1 < pi1t−1 < x, we have the same kind of results as above: one only has
to substitute x2t , for x1t and pi2t for pi1t .
• The case where pi1t−1 = pi2t−1 < x.
Lemma 8. In a Nash equilibrium, we have : x1t > pi1t .
Proof. Same as the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 9. In a Nash equilibrium, we always have max{x1t , x2t } ≤ x.
Proof. Same proof as that of Lemma 4
Lemma 10. In a Nash equilibrium, we have: min{x1t , x2t } ≥ pi1t−1.
Proof. Same proof as that of Lemma 5
Lemma 11. In a Nash equilibrium, we have: max{pi1t , pi2t } ≤ x.
Proof. We already know that x1t ≥ pi1t and x1t ≤ x (lemmas 8 and 9). Let us show that
pi2t ≤ x. If x2t ≥ pi2t , this is immediate (Lemma 9). Assume now that x2t < pi2t . If pi2t ≥ x then
pi2t−1 ≥ x (because of Lemma 2), which is impossible and the result follows.
Remark. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 12. In a Nash equilibrium we have: pi1t−1 = pi2t−1 = min{pi1t−1, pi2t−1} ≤ min{pi1t , pi2t }.
Proof. If pi2t ≥ pi1t , this is immediate, since pi1t ≥ pi1t−1, and pi1t−1 = pi2t−1 by assumption.
Assume now that pi1t ≥ pi2t . Assume that pi2t < pi1t−1. If x2t ≥ pi2t , this is impossible (because
pi1t−1 = pi2t−1 and pi2t ≥ pi2t−1). If x2t < pi2t , then we have x2t < pi2t < pi1t−1, but from Lemma 10
this is impossible.
21
Remark. The proof is similar to that as Lemma 7.
• The Case where pi1t−1 < pi2t−1 = x.
Lemma 13. In a Nash equilibrium, we have : x1t > pi1t .
Proof. Same proof as that of Lemma 3.
Lemma 14. In a Nash equilibrium, we always have max{x1t , x2t } ≤ x.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4. Assume that x1t ≥ x2t . As x1t > pi1t (Lemma
13), we must have Z11 (x1t , x) ≥ 0, so that x1t ≤ x and the conclusion follows. Suppose instead
that x1t < x2t . If x2t ≥ pi2t , then as Z21 (x2t , x) ≥ 0, we must have x2t ≤ x and the conclusion
follows again. If, on the other hand, we have x2t < pi2t , then since we have pi2t ≤ pi2t−1 = x,
the proof is complete.
Lemma 15. In a Nash equilibrium, we have: min{x1t , x2t } ≥ pi1t−1.
Proof. If x2t ≥ x1t , this is immediate (this stems from Lemmas 2 and 13). Assume now that
x1t > x
2
t . Assume that x2t ≤ pi2t . Then Z21 (x2t , x) ≤ 0 and thus x2t ≥ x. So pi2t−1 = pi2t = x2t = x.
Since pi1t−1 < x, we are done. Then consider the case x2t > pi2t . As x1t > x2t and from Lemma
2, pi2t ≥ pi2t−1 = x > pi1t−1, the conclusion follows.
Lemma 16. In a Nash equilibrium, we have: max{pi1t , pi2t } ≤ x.
Proof. We already know that x1t ≥ pi1t and x1t ≤ x (Lemmas 13 and 14). Let us show that
pi2t ≤ x. If x2t ≥ pi2t , as from Lemma 2, pi2t ≥ pi2t−1 = x, and from Lemma 14, x2t ≤ x, we have
x2t = pi2t = x. Assume now that x2t < pi2t . From Lemma 2, pi2t ≤ pi2t−1 = x. The result then
follows easily.
Lemma 17. In a Nash equilibrium we have: min{pi1t−1, pi2t−1} = pi1t−1 ≤ min{pi1t , pi2t }.
Proof. If pi2t ≥ pi1t , this is immediate, since pi1t ≥ pi1t−1 (Lemma 2 and Lemma 13). Assume
now that pi2t < pi1t . The case pi2t < pi1t−1 is impossible. Indeed, if x2t ≥ pi2t , from Lemma 2
pi2t ≥ pi2t−1, and then pi1t−1 > pi2t−1 is a contradiction. If x2t < pi2t , then we have x2t ≤ pi2t < pi1t−1,
but from Lemma 15 this is impossible.
Remark The previous analysis enables one to handle the case where pi2t−1 < pi1t−1 = x.
• The case pi1t−1 = pi2t−1 = x
It is clear that in this case, there are legal and preferences unifications: x1t = x2t = pi1t =
pi2t .
Remarks. From the preceding lemmas, we have:
pi1−1 = min{pi1−1, pi2−1} ≤ min{pi10, pi20}, (37)
max{pi10, pi20} ≤ x, (38)
pi1−1 = min{pi1−1, pi2−1} ≤ min{x10, x20}, (39)
max{x10, x20} ≤ x. (40)
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Assume that: pi10 ≤ pi20. Then, from the same lemmas, we will have
pi10 ≤ min{pi11, pi21}, (41)
max{pi11, pi21} ≤ x, (42)
pi10 ≤ min{x11, x21}, (43)
max{x11, x21} ≤ x. (44)
If not (pi20 < pi10), we will have:
pi20 ≤ min{pi11, pi21} (45)
max{pi11, pi21} ≤ x (46)
pi20 ≤ min{x11, x21} (47)
max{x11, x21} ≤ x. (48)
To put it differently, we have:
min{pi10, pi20} ≤ min{pi11, pi21} (49)
max{pi11, pi21} ≤ x (50)
min{pi10, pi20} ≤ min{x11, x21} (51)
max{x11, x21} ≤ x. (52)
It is easy to see that these inequations are satisfied for all dates t (and not only at dates 0
and 1), whether pi1t−1 ≤ pi2t−1 or not. This implies that (x1t , x2t , pi1t , pi2t ) ∈ [min{pi1−1, pi2−1}, x]4
for all t. Moreover, the sequence (λt)t where λt = min{pi1t , pi2t }, is non-decreasing and upper-
bounded. It therefore has a limit λ ≤ x. The next Lemma insures that λ = x, and thus that
the sequence of equilibria converges to x (legal uniformity is achieved in the long run).
Convergence in the case max{pi1−1, pi2−1} ≤ x
Lemma 18. Let a sequence of Nash equilibria (x1t , x2t , pi1t , pi2t )t be given, with max{pi1−1, pi2−1} ≤
x. Then, this sequence has a limit which satisfies: pi1∞ = pi2∞ = x1∞ = x2∞ = x.
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that at each date t, there are only four possible kinds of
equilibria:
1. piit−1 ≤ piit ≤ xit, i = 1, 2.
2. pi1t−1 ≤ pi1t ≤ x1t and x2t ≤ pi2t ≤ pi2t−1,
3. x1t ≤ pi1t ≤ pi1t−1 and pi2t−1 ≤ pi2t ≤ x2t ,
4. xit ≤ piit ≤ piit−1, i = 1, 2.
We notice that in the last case, we must have: xit = piit, i = 1, 2. Indeed, since we
know that V ii (xit, piit) ≥ 0 and Zi1(xit, x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. This implies that U i(xit, xjt ) ≤ 0,
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. These last inequations mean that x1t = x2t . As V ii (xit, piit) + Zi1(xit, x) = 0,
the conclusion follows. If xit = piit = x at date t, these equations also hold for all posterior
periods and the Lemma follows.
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Assume now that the fourth kind of equilibrium never occurs. Assume also that there
is an infinite number of these periods in which the first kind of equilibrium occurs. In all
of these periods, the sequence (pi1s−1, pi1s, x1s, pi2s−1, pi2s, x2s) lies in a compact set. There thus
exists a converging subsequence with a limit (pˆi1, pi1, x1, pˆi2, pi2, x2). The coordinates of this
limit satisfy by construction: pˆi1 ≤ pi1 ≤ x1 and pˆi2 ≤ pi2 ≤ x2.
Recall now that the sequence (λt)t is non-decreasing and upper-bounded (we have de-
fined above λt = min{pi1t , pi2t }). Let λ be its limit. Thus we have min{pˆi1, pˆi2} = λ, and
min{pi1, pi2} = λ.16
Assume that: pˆi1 = pi1 = λ. Then we have: W 11 (pi1, pˆi1) = 0, and then V 12 (x1, pi1) =
0. This implies that: x1 = pi1 = λ. From U1(x1, x2) + V 11 (x1, pi1) + Z11 (x1, x) = 0, we
have: U1(x1, x2) ≤ 0, and thus x1 ≥ x2. Thus λ ≥ x2. But we also have for all dates
s λs ≤ min{x1s, x2s}. Hence, λ ≤ min{x1, x2}. Therefore x2 = λ. This then implies that
xi = pii = x, i = 1, 2.
The same argument applies if pˆi2 = pi2 = λ.
Assume now that: pˆi1 = λ and pi2 = λ. This implies that W 21 (pi2, pˆi2) ≥ 0 (since pi2 ≤ pˆi2).
Thus V 22 (x2, pi2) ≤ 0. Therefore, V 21 (x2, pi2) ≥ 0. Since by construction pi2 ≤ x2, we
have x2 = pi2 = λ. But since U2(x2, x2) + V 21 (x2, pi2) + Z21 (x2, x) = 0, this implies that
U2(x2, x1) ≤ 0. Thus x2 ≥ x1. Since x1 ≥ λ, we have x1 = pi1 = λ. But these equations
mean that xi = pii = x, i = 1, 2.
The case where pi1 = λ and pˆi2 = λ can be handled as above.
We can then conclude that λ = x.
Assume now that there is only a finite number of periods in which the first kind of
equilibrium, we can construct a converging subsequence with a limit (pˆi1, pi1, x1, pˆi2, pi2, x2)
which satisfies: pˆi1 ≤ pi1 ≤ x1 and x2 ≤ pi2 ≤ pˆi2 with min{pˆi1, pˆi2} = λ, and min{pi1, pi2} = λ.
Assume that: pˆi1 = pi1 = λ. From W 1(pi1, pˆi1) = 0, we can show that x1 = pi1 = λ. Thus
λ = x1 ≥ x2. But since we also have x2 ≥ x1 (from U2(x2, x1) +V 21 (x2, pi2) +Z21 (x2, x) = 0),
we have x1 = x2 = λ and then λ = x.
Assume that pˆi1 = λ and pi2 = λ. We have then λ ≥ x2 and λ ≤ x1. But we also have
x1 ≤ x2, therefore x1 = x2. It follows that xi = pˆii = pii = λ, i = 1, 2, and then λ = x.
Assume then that pˆi2 = λ, and pi2 = λ. From W 2(pi2, pˆi2) = 0, we can show that
x2 = pi2 = λ. Since x2 ≥ x1 and x1 ≥ λ, we again have xi = pˆii = pii = λ, i = 1, 2, and then
λ = x.
The last case to be considered is where pˆi2 = λ, and pi1 = λ. From W 2(pi2, pˆi2) ≥ 0, we can
show that V 22 (x2, pi2) ≤ 0 and then that V 11 (x2, pi2) ≥ 0. Then from U2(x2, x1)+V 21 (x2, pi2)+
Z21 (x2, x) = 0, we have x2 ≥ x1. This proves that x1 = λ. Thus, xi = pˆii = pii = λ, i = 1, 2,
and then λ = x.
If there is only a finite number of periods in which the second kind of equilibrium occurs,
there is then an infinite number of times in which the third kind of equilibrium occurs. In
that case, we can prove as in the last case that λ = x. The proof is complete.
16This is because the subsequences min{pi1sk , pi2sk}, and min{pi1sk−1, pi2sk−1} both converge to λ.
24
The preceding conclusion also holds, by symmetry for the case where x ≤ min{pi1−1, pi2−1}.
• The Case where pi1−1 < x < pi2−1
Assume that pi1t−1 < x < pi2t−1 (the same conclusion would apply if pi2t−1 < x < pi1t−1).
Lemma 19. Let (x1t , x2t , pi1t , pi2t ) be a Nash equilibrium.Then we necessarily have: pi1t−1 ≤
pi1t < x
1
t and x2t < pi2t < pi2t−1.
Proof. It is easy to see that Lemma 2 holds, so that x1t > pi1t . Assume that pi2t = pi2t−1.
Then we must have V 22 (x2t , pi2t ) = 0, and then x2t = pi2t . But this in turn implies that:
U21 (x2t , x1t ) + Z21 (x2t , x) = 0. If x2t ≥ x1t , then x2t ≤ x so that pi2t−1 ≤ x which is impossible.
Assume then that x2t ≤ x1t . So x2t ≥ x. Since x1t ≥ x and x1t ≥ x2t , we must have x1t ≤ pi1t .
which is impossible. We have therefore proved that pi2t 6= pi2t−1. This proves also that x2t 6= pi2t .
Suppose now that x2t > pi2t > pi2t−1. If x2t ≥ x1t , then Z21 (x2t , x) ≥ 0, which implies
that x ≥ x2t . This is impossible since this would imply that pi2t−1 < x. If x1t ≥ x2t , then
Z11 (x1t , x) ≥ 0, and thus x1t ≤ x. Again, we would have pi2t−1 < x, which is impossible.
Lemma 20. Let a sequence of Nash equilibria (x1t , x2t , pi1t , pi2t )t be given, with pi1−1 < x <
pi2−1. Then all the terms of the sequences converge to x: limt→+∞ pi1t = limt→+∞ x1t =
limt→+∞ x2t = limt→+∞ pi2t = x.
Proof. Assume that pi1−1 < x < pi2−1. Then Lemma 19 holds. Therefore, if pi10 ≥ x, necessarily
we have x10 ≥ x and thus x20 ≥ x (because we must have x2t ≥ x1t ) which in turn implies
pi20 ≥ x. If pi20 ≤ x, then necessarily x20 < x. Therefore x20 ≥ x10 and then pi10 < x. The
preceding conclusions hold for pi1t ≥ x and pi2t ≤ x respectively if pi1t−1 < x < pi2t−1.
Suppose that there is no s ∈ N such that pi1s ≥ x or pi2s ≤ x (so: pi1s < x < pi2s for all
s). By Lemma 19, the sequence (pi1t )t is a non-decreasing sequence bounded above by x,
whereas (pi2t )t is a non-increasing sequence bounded below by x. Then we can show (using
subsequences if necessary) that (pi1t )t and (pi2t )t as well as the sequences (x1t )t and (pi2t )t go
to x.
If, on the other hand, there is s such that pi1s ≥ x or pi2s ≤ x (with pi1s−1 < x < pi2s−1), then
we are in a case that has already been considered (both pi1s and pi2s are either lower or greater
than x). Our convergence results for these cases prove the statement of the Lemma.
Since we have proved the convergence result for all initial conditions, the proof is com-
plete.
Proof of Proposition 4. In a steady-state, we have W i1(pi, pi) = 0, i = 1, 2. So V i2 (xi, pii) = 0,
and thus xi = pii. Necessarily, x1 < x2. Otherwise, from the first equation, we would
have U11 ≤ 0, and then Z11 ≥ 0, which would imply x1 ≤ x1. But from the corresponding
equation for country 2, we would also have: Z21 ≤ 0, or x2 ≥ x2. So, we would have:
x2 ≤ x2 ≤ x1 ≤ x1, which is a contradiction. Now, x1 < x2 implies U11 > 0, and then
x1 > x1. This also implies Z21 > 0 and thus x2 < x2.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that x1t < x1. Then suppose x2t ≤ x1t . Therefore x2t < x2. Nec-
essarily, V 21 (x2t , pi2t ) < 0. So x2t > pi2t , and thus, x2t > pi2t > pi2t−1. But this is a contradiction.
So, we must have: x1t ≤ x2t . This then implies that V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) < 0, so x1t > pi1t > pi1t−1, which
is a contradiction again. As a consequence, we must have x1t ≥ x1. By symmetry, we have
x2t ≤ x2.
Now let us prove that x1t ≤ x2. If we had x1t > x2 this would imply V 11 (x1t , pi1t ) > 0, and
thus x1t < pi1t < pi1t−1 which is a contradiction. We can prove likewise that x2t ≥ x1.
Let us now show that piit ∈ [x1, x2], i=1,2. Without loss of generality, we only prove
the result for pi1t . If pi1t ≥ pi1t−1, then x1t ≥ pi1t ≥ pi1t−1 ≥ x1. On the other hand, if
pi1t−1 ≥ pi1t , then, pi1t−1 ≥ pi1t ≥ x1t ≥ x1. By induction, we can conclude the proof that
(xis, piis) ∈ [x1, x2]× [x1, x2], for all s ≥ t, and i = 1, 2.
Remark. Since (x1s, pi1s, x2s, pi2s) is in [x1, x2]4 for s ≥ t − 1, there is a convergence
subsequence (as [x1, x2]4 is compact). This proves that there are an infinite number of times
for which the sequence is arbitrarily close to the steady-state studied above.
Proof of Proposition 5. To analyze the dynamics, we can express (x1t , x2t ) with respect to
(pi1t , pi2t ). We have:(α1 + β1 + θ1) −α1
−α2 (α2 + β2 + θ2)
x1t
x2t
 =
β1pi1t + θ1x1
β2pi2t + θ2x2
 (53)
We define:
A =
(α1 + β1 + θ1) −α1
−α2 (α2 + β2 + θ2)
 (54)
We find that:x1t
x2t
 = 1det(A)
(α2 + β2 + θ2) α1
α2 (α1 + β1 + θ1)
β1pi1t + θ1x1
β2pi2t + θ2x2
 (55)
where:
det(A) = (α1 + β1 + θ1)(α2 + β2 + θ2)− α1α2 (56)
= α1(β2 + θ2) + α2(β1 + θ1) + (β1 + θ1)(β2 + θ2) > 0 (57)
We then deduce that:
x1t =
1
det(A)
(
β1(α2 + β2 + θ2)pi1t + θ1(α2 + β2 + θ2)x1 + α1(β2pi2t + θ2x2)
)
(58)
x2t =
1
det(A)
(
β2(α1 + β1 + θ1)pi2t + θ2(α1 + β1 + θ1)x2 + α2(β1pi1t + θ1x1)
)
(59)
By plugging (58) and (59) in equations (24) and (26) respectively we obtain the the following
linear equations system:
β1
det(A)
[
β1(α2 + β2 + θ2)pi1t + θ1(α2 + β2 + θ2)x1 + α1(β2pi2t + θ2x2)
]
− β1pi1t − γ1pi1t + γ1pi1t−1 = 0
(60)
β1
det(A)
[
β2(α1 + β1 + θ1)pi2t + θ2(α1 + β1 + θ1)x2 + α2(β1pi1t + θ1x1)
]
− β2pi2t − γ2pi2t + γ2pi2t−1 = 0
(61)
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We can rewrite the above system as follows:β21(α2 + β2 + θ2 − (β1 + γ1)det(A) α1β1β2
α2β1β2 β22(α1 + β1 + θ1)− (β2 + γ2)det(A)
pi1t
pi2t

=
−β1θ1(α2 + β2 + θ2)x1 − γ1pi1t−1det(A)− α1β1θ2x2
−β2α2θ1x1 − β2(α1 + β1 + θ1)θ2x2 − γ2pi2t−1det(A)
 (62)
We let B be the matrix given by:
B =
β21(α2 + β2 + θ2)− (β1 + γ1)det(A) α1β1β2
α2β1β2 β22(α1 + β1 + θ1)− (β2 + γ2)det(A)
 (63)
We therefore have:pi1t
pi2t
 = 1det(B)
β22(α1 + β1 + θ1)− (β2 + γ2)det(A) −α1β1β2
−α2β1β2 β21(α2 + β2 + θ2)− (β1 + γ1)det(A)

×
−β1θ1(α2 + β2 + θ2)x1 − β1α1θ2x2 − γ1pi1t−1det(A)
−β2α2θ1x1 − β2(α1 + β1 + θ1)θ2x2 − γ2pi2t−1det(A)
 (64)
where:
det(B) =
(
β21(α2 + β2 + θ2)− (β1 + γ1)det(A)
) (
β22(α1 + β1 + θ1)− (β2 + γ2)det(A)
)
− α1α2β21β22
(65)
Or:pi1t
pi2t
 =
−(β
2
2(α1+β1+θ1)−(β2+γ2)det(A))γ1det(A)
det(B)
α2β1β2γ2det(A)
det(B)
(α1β1β2)γ1det(A)
det(B) −
(β21(α2+β2+θ2)−(β1+γ1)det(A))γ2det(A)
det(B)

pi1t−1
pi2t−2

+

[(
β22(α1 + β1 + θ1)− (β2 + γ2)det(A)
) (−β1θ1(α2 + β2 + θ2)x1 − β1α1θ2x2)
+α1β1β22θ1x1 + α1β1β22(α1 + β1 + θ1)θ2x2
] 1
det(B)[
(β1α2β2)(β1θ1(α2 + β2 + θ2)x1 + α1β1θ2x2)
+ (β21(α2 + β2 + θ2)− (β1 + γ1)det(A))(−α2β2θ1x1 − β2(α1 + β1 + θ1)θ2x2)
] 1
det(B)

(66)
We let C be defined as follows:
C =
−(β
2
2(α1+β1+θ1)−(β2+γ2)det(A))γ1det(A)
det(B)
α2β1β2γ2det(A)
det(B)
(α1β1β2)γ1det(A)
det(B) −
(β21(α2+β2+θ2)−(β1+γ1)det(A))γ2det(A)
det(B)
 (67)
We want to check that all the modulus of the characteristic roots of C are strictly less than
one. Let P (λ) be the characteristic polynomial of C, i.e.,
P (λ) = λ2 − Tλ+D = 0 (68)
where D and T denote the determinant and the trace of C respectively. The necessary and
sufficient conditions for all the modulus of the characteristic roots to be strictly lower than
one are:
P (1) = 1− T +D > 0, (69)
P (−1) = 1 + T +D > 0, (70)
|P (0)| = |D| < 1. (71)
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We can check that:
Lemma 21. We have det(B) > 0, T > 0, D = det(A)
2
det(B) γ1γ2.
Cumbersome algebra reveals that:
Lemma 22. We have: |D| < 1.
Cumbersome algebra also reveals that:
Lemma 23. We have: 1− T +D > 0.
From the necessary and sufficient conditions for the modulus of the characteristic roots
to be strictly lower than one and the previous Lemma, we can conclude that in the quadratic
case, the steady-state is globally stable.
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